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She who hesitates is lost.2
American legal realism numbers among the most important theoretical 
contributions of legal academia to date. Given the movement’s influence, 
as well as the common centrality of certain key figures, it is surprising that 
privacy scholarship in the United States has paid next to no attention to the 
movement. This inattention is unfortunate for several reasons, including 
that privacy law furnishes rich examples of the indeterminacy thesis — a 
key concept of American legal realism — and because the interdisciplinary 
efforts of privacy scholars to explore extra-legal influences on privacy law 
arguably further the plot of legal realism itself.
IntroductIon
In the early twentieth century, a group of American scholars and jurists sought 
to reveal the common law as a contextual, open-ended system owing as much 
* Lane Powell and D. Wayne Gittinger Associate Professor of Law, University of 
Washington. I’m indebted to Neil Richards, Danielle Keats Citron, and Woodrow 
Hartzog for their initial insights and to Hanoch Dagan, Ruth Gavison, Anita 
Allen, Julie Cohen, Helen Nissenbaum, Valerie Steeves, Lisa Austin, Mireille 
Hildebrandt, Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius and other participants in The 
Problem of Theorizing Privacy workshop hosted by the Cegla Center at Tel 
Aviv University. I’m especially grateful for the detailed original and summarized 
feedback from Alon Jasper and the other editors of Theoretical Inquiries of Law. 
Cite as: Ryan Calo, Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy, 20 TheoreTical inquiries l. 
33 (2019).
1 alexander PoPe, an essay on criTicism (London, 1711). The full quotation is, 
“For Fools rush in where Angels fear to tread.” Id. at 66.
2 Adaptation of the line, “The woman that deliberates is lost.” JosePh addison, 
caTo: a Tragedy, and selecTed essays 30 (2004). See also oliver Wendall 
holmes, sr., The auTocraT aT The BreakfasT TaBle 29 (1858) (“The woman 
who ‘calculates’ is lost.”).
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to experience and intuition as to rules and logic. The resulting movement — 
American legal realism — is among the most important theoretical contributions 
to jurisprudence to date, even as its origins and contours remain contested. 
Law and economics, empirical legal studies, and critical theory each owe 
their origins in part to the conversation Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Karl 
Llewellyn, Roscoe Pound, and others instigated a century ago.
Given the movement’s influence — as well as the common centrality of 
key figures such as Louis Brandeis — it is perhaps surprising that privacy 
scholarship in the United States has paid scant attention to legal realism to 
date. Privacy scholars refer to legal realism in passing but have yet to explore 
its influence in depth.3 
This inattention is unfortunate for several reasons. First, privacy law 
furnishes rich and complex examples for legal realism, particularly with 
respect to the indeterminacy thesis. Simply stated, the indeterminacy thesis 
holds that the law as a system is sometimes, often, or always capable of 
supporting multiple resolutions to a given conflict.4 Privacy law, meanwhile, 
is comprised almost entirely of hard cases.5 Privacy shifts with technology — 
often rapidly. Privacy is seldom a value found in isolation; it must frequently 
compete with other values such as free speech.6 Privacy doctrine is littered 
with exceptions. And even litigants who succeed in meeting the technical 
elements of a privacy cause of action face additional, somewhat arbitrary 
barriers such as prudential standing. These and other facets of privacy law 
make for an interesting case study in indeterminacy and suggest that critiques 
of privacy law can be recast in legal realist terms.
 Second, contemporary privacy scholarship arguably furthers the plot 
of legal realism itself by furnishing powerful evidence that the application 
of social science to doctrine, if anything, compounds indeterminacy. If the 
common law yields few clear answers to legal questions, as legal realism 
3 See, e.g., aniTa l. allen, Privacy and socieTy 25-26, 39, 585 (2007) (Anita 
Allen’s wonderful “comprehensive introduction to the privacy law of the United 
States” mentions positivism and “realism” in the abstract but not legal realism); 
Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment, 60 sTan. l. rev. 503 (2007); 
Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 geo. l.J. 357 
(2003) [hereinafter Kerr, The Problem of Perspective] (Orin Kerr has written at 
least two interesting papers on the indeterminacy of criminal procedure without 
invoking legal realism).
4 See infra Part I.
5 h.l.a. harT, The concePT of laW 124 (1961). 
6 See infra Part II.
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posits, then on what basis are judges deciding those cases?7 Setting legal 
process to one side,8 contemporary legal theory has a range of candidates at 
the ready to fill the gaps left by doctrinal indeterminacy. Law and economics 
posits that doctrine is or should be aiming at efficiency, for instance, whereas 
critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist legal studies envision 
doctrine as preserving specific dynamics of power. On this account, social 
science and theory helps explain legal outcomes by getting outside the four 
corners of law itself. 
Privacy scholarship largely cannot imagine a full account of law without 
social science or theory, to the point that several of privacy law’s leading voices 
possess no formal legal training.9 Yet far from helping to explain privacy law 
and policy outcomes, our best analyses offer rich new sources of what we 
might call secondary indeterminacy. Thus, for example, Alessandro Acquisti 
and colleagues painstakingly examine the privacy and economics literature, 
only to conclude that the question of privacy’s efficiency is itself subject 
to manipulation depending on starting assumptions and model selection.10 
Economics cannot explain privacy law decisions because the economics of 
privacy, too, are indeterminate. Privacy law helps to remind us that indeterminacy 
is endemic to human pursuits and that privacy survives or flourishes only 
when it is held as an ascendant value.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I gives a thumbnail sketch of American 
legal realism by tracing its origins and describing some of the movement’s 
core commitments, with particular emphasis on the indeterminacy thesis. 
Part II argues that facets of privacy law, at least in the United States, may 
render it uniquely indeterminate; at any rate, U.S. privacy law furnishes a 
number of interesting and powerful examples of legal realism at play in courts 
and policy debates today. Part III offers some thoughts about what privacy 
scholarship might contribute to the longstanding legal realist debate. Privacy 
scholarship is, first, deeply interdisciplinary, and second, long accustomed to 
7 E.g., Brian Bix, JurisPrudence: Theory and conTexT 185-86 (2003) (“In many 
ways, can be seen as the forerunner of . . . . law and economics, critical legal 
studies, critical race theory and feminist legal theory.”). 
8 Legal process posits that institutional structures, jurisprudential habits, and other 
safeguards help domesticate the problem of indeterminacy. See infra Part I for 
a longer discussion. 
9 Others possess dual training. The leading United States conference on privacy 
is Privacy Law Scholars Conference, where the predominant mode of analysis 
is law and policy. Participation is incredibly interdisciplinary, however, and 
(fascinating) papers with only a tenuous connection to the law are commonplace. 
10 Alessandro Acquisti et al., The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. econ. liTeraTure 
442 (2016).
36 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 20.1:33
contradiction. Thus, as a field, privacy scholarship is well-positioned to shed 
light on the role of basic values in channeling legal results not adequately 
explained by law, efficiency, race, or gender. 
I. AmerIcAn LegAL reALIsm
American legal realism11 refers to a conversation about the nature of legal 
interpretation that arose in the early twentieth century, intensifying in the 
1930s and ’40s and continuing to this day.12 Its chief precursors and adherents 
include Oliver Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, Jr., Roscoe Pound, Karl 
Llewellyn, Felix Cohen, Robert Hale, and Jerome Frank.13 
While far from monolithic, legal realism tends to share certain common 
commitments. First, legal realists generally characterize their project as a 
reaction to legal formalism, i.e., the idea that law constitutes a “mechanical” 
exercise and that legal conclusions follow syllogistically from accepted 
premises.14 Legal formalism was to be found not only in the thinking of 
common law judges at the end of the nineteenth century but also in the 
education of new lawyers under the case method pioneered at Harvard Law 
School and still around today.15
Second, legal realists tend to emphasize the centrality of human experience 
and the importance of drawing from the natural and social sciences to inform 
legal interpretation and understanding. Thus, legal realists draw inspiration 
from Holmes’ famous edict that “the life of the law has not been logic; it has 
been experience”16 and often take a form of his “predictive stance,” in the 
sense of characterizing the law in terms of how judges are likely to decide 
11 I use “American” legal realism to distinguish a parallel but distinct effort in 
Northern Europe. See Jes Bjarup, The Philosophy of Scandinavian Legal Realism, 
18 raTio Juris 1 (2005).
12 I do not mean this brief summary of legal realism to be comprehensive. For a 
full discussion, see Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 calif. l. 
rev. 465 (1988) (reviewing laura kalman, legal realism aT yale: 1927-1960 
(1986)).
13 Legal realism permeates the legal academy today, although we might think of 
Laura Kalman, Hanoch Dagan, Frederick Schauer, Grant Gilmore, Brian Leiter, 
and others as continuing the specific conversation within jurisprudence.
14 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 colum. l. rev. 605 (1908). But 
see infra Part II.
15 Bix, supra note 7, at 179-80 (referring to the efforts of Harvard Dean Christopher 
Columbus Langdell to formalize legal instruction).
16 oliver Wendell holmes, Jr., The common laW (London, Macmillan 1881). 
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cases in practice. Some realists understand jurists to owe a duty to consider 
the societal impact of applying a particular legal principle,17 while others 
seek merely to describe judicial behavior. Today’s sub-disciplines of law and 
society and empirical legal studies owe much to legal realism in this respect.
Third, many legal realists are committed, albeit to varying degrees, to the 
premise that legal doctrine writ large does not dictate specific results in a given 
case or cabin discretion to the extent that formalist judicial rhetoric implies. 
The strong form of this idea — sometimes known as the “indeterminacy thesis” 
— is that judges are free to select from conflicting, but equally applicable, 
principles or precedents to decide a given matter before the court. 
The indeterminacy thesis implies, if not logically entails, that something 
other than doctrine must guide judges in deciding cases, since the answer cannot 
be found within the four corners of the law itself. Thus, the indeterminacy 
thesis is sympathetic with the insight that legal decisions cannot be formally 
derived from rules (anti-formalism), as well as with the legal realist affinity 
for infusing pragmatic, social scientific reasoning into legal interpretation.18 
Said another way, doctrine purports to cabin discretion but, for a variety 
of reasons, in fact judges are free to choose among equally applicable legal 
principles to decide an individual case. Judging is an ad hoc enterprise guided 
by law, perhaps, but not strictly speaking dictated by formal rules. This is 
so despite pretensions of objectivity and constraint and notwithstanding the 
fact that court decisions have consequences that materially affect the lives 
of litigants.19 
17 E.g., John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 cornell l.q. 17 (1924) (exposing 
a pragmatist understanding of the role of legal interpretation). We also see this 
commitment in the legal realist embrace of the famous Brandeis Brief. 
18 See generally Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule 
of Law, 163 u. Pa. l. rev. 1889 (2015). It is important to note that the strong 
form of indeterminacy is not widely held among legal realists, who acknowledge 
the existence of a variety of constraints — constraints which the legal process 
school, associated with Hebert Wechsler, Henry Hart, Lon Fuller, and others, 
explores in depth. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 harv. l. rev. 1 (1959). But the basic idea that law 
often contains support for multiple outcomes and thereby enables judicial 
discretion seems (i) obviously true and (ii) of tremendous, ongoing relevance 
to contemporary legal discourse. 
19 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 yale l.J. 1601 (1986). 
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Legal realists have identified a number of mechanisms behind indeterminacy. 
The simplest may be the coexistence of two or more distinct lines of reasoning 
within the same jurisdiction regarding the same issue.20 
For example, Llewellyn identifies a deep instability in the very nature 
of common law precedent and, famously, in popular canons of statutory 
interpretation. He dramatizes the former by, for instance, noting the leeway 
judges have in parsing the holding of a case from mere dicta.21 Llewellyn 
dramatizes the latter by laying side by side various “dueling canons” of 
statutory interpretation, i.e., by showing that important principles of statutory 
interpretation conflict with one another, leaving the judge free to decide among 
them.22 For example, courts should simultaneously defer to clear statements 
of legislative intent but also inquire into the legislature’s “real” motivations.23
Felix Cohen identifies malleability in the habitual use of ungrounded 
concepts. “Our legal system is filled with supernatural concepts,” Cohen 
writes, “ . . . . which cannot be defined in terms of experience, and from which 
all sorts of empirical decisions are supposed to flow.”24 Such “conceptual 
essentialism” invites judges to imbue abstract ideas such as “property,” 
“contract,” or the “corporation” with whatever qualities support the conclusion 
that judge wishes to reach. The upshot of these and other features of the law 
is that, for legal realists in this mode, “[g]enerally stated rules of law do not 
so much explain as conceal the bases of judicial decision.”25 
Several caveats are in order. First, as Brian Tamanaha convincingly argues, 
formalism has always been a bit of a straw man. Legal realists and their progeny 
tend to overstate the sway formalism held over law and legal education up 
20 karl n. lleWellyn, Some Realism About Realism, in JurisPrudence: realism 
in Theory and PracTice 42 (2008) (1962). See also Dagan, supra note 18, at 
1891-92. 
21 karl n. lleWellyn, The BramBle Bush: The classic lecTures on The laW 
and laW school (1951). 
22 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules 
or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 vand. l. rev. 395 (1950). 
23 Id. at 402. For a recent critique of Llewellyn for failing adequately to support 
the dueling canons thesis, see michael sinclair, karl lleWellyn’s dueling 
canons in PersPecTive (2014). 
24 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 34 
colum. l. rev. 809 (1935). 
25 Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 yale l.J. 1037-38 
(1961). Gilmore admits this “overstate[s] the legal realists’ position, as the 
realists overstated the position of their predecessors” (the formalists); Id. 
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to and through the turn of the twentieth century.26 Tamanaha traces extensive 
evidence that jurists and academics during the supposed heyday of legal 
formalism — roughly 1870 to 1920 — actually recognized law’s pragmatism 
and pliability to a significant degree. Judges do not, and never did, understand 
themselves as applying the law without any discretion, but rather have long 
embraced a balance between discretion and restraint. 
Second, not all realists adhere to the indeterminacy thesis in its strongest state.27 
Jerome Frank — often associated with the strong form of the indeterminacy 
thesis that imagines unfettered judicial discretion — may be something of 
an outlier.28 The commitment to indeterminism among “mainstream” legal 
realists is often misunderstood and overstated. “The realist claim of radical 
doctrinal indeterminacy implies a wide breadth of potential judicial choice,” 
Hanoch Dagan argues, “but does not mean that judges use, should use, or 
should even consider using this menu of options in every case.”29 Although 
judges face individual choices, just as realists argue, they tend to experience 
law overall as stable and predictable, and understand the distinction between 
interpretations that comport with expectation and those that do not.30 
Whatever the specific characterization, it seems hard to deny legal realism 
generally, the indeterminacy thesis in particular, as deeply instructive and 
highly influential. At a minimum, the realists laid bare a longstanding tension 
in the law between constraint and discretion and elevated the importance of 
natural and social science to legal interpretation and understanding. Even 
critics of legal realism acknowledge its influence on subsequent legal theory. 
To whatever extent that doctrine is indeterminate, its students must look 
beyond the rules themselves at the individuals, institutions, and sociocultural 
forces at play in legal interpretation. Thus, any area of study that either aims 
to bring social scientific methods to bear on legal questions or otherwise 
purports to explain how extralegal forces shape judicial outcomes owes a 
modest debt to legal realism.
26 Brian Z. Tamahana, Beyond The formalisT-realisT divide: The role of PoliTics 
in Judging (2010). 
27 ervin harold Pollack, JurisPrudence: PrinciPles and aPPlicaTions 813 (1979) 
(“There were almost as many strands in realist thinking as there were realists.”).
28 Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 
76 Tex. l. rev. 267 (1997). 
29 Dagan, supra note 18, at 1902.
30 I owe this refinement to Hanoch Dagan. On my understanding, Dagan’s analysis 
also implies that the distinction between legal realists such as Llewellyn and 
Cohen and legal process theorists such as Wechsler and Fuller is somewhat 
artificial. Both the latter and the former acknowledge that the law, as a system, 
channels participants by its very structure and thereby acts to constrain discretion. 
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II. LegAL reALIsm In PrIvAcy
We are all legal realists now, as the saying goes.31 Few areas of law or legal 
scholarship entirely ignore the natural and social sciences. Few observers 
would deny that judges at times craft law and policy rather than follow 
specific doctrine.
Privacy law is no exception. From its very beginnings in nineteenth-
century tort, privacy law has been awash in legal realism. What is The Right 
to Privacy, after all, but an attempt to break from the formal strictures of tort 
in light of human experience? “Political, social, and economic changes entail 
the recognition of new rights,” its authors argue, “and the common law, in 
its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”32 One went on to 
coauthor the Brandeis Brief — an emblem of legal realism that helped inspire 
a turn toward the social sciences in adjudication.33 Today, privacy law as a 
discipline is steeped in social science, inviting investigations from fields as 
diverse as economics, computer science, anthropology, sociology, and science 
and technology studies in order to understand privacy’s place in society. 
Privacy, no less than other areas of law, incorporates legal realism. 
Privacy law also furnishes plenty of standard examples of indeterminacy. 
The indeterminacy thesis holds, again, that judges commonly have access to 
multiple, conflicting principles when deciding specific cases.34 Imagine that a 
judge must decide whether an unflattering recording taken during a fraternity 
pledge event by a student journalist posing as a pledge constitutes an intrusion 
upon seclusion. An unsympathetic judge could note that fraternity pledges 
are open to all members of the student body and that participants assume 
the risk that someone will repeat what is said. Whereas a sympathetic judge 
(once a frat brother himself) could characterize the event as semi-private or 
emphasize the invasiveness of a hidden recording. Each of these currents runs 
through privacy law, sometimes in the same jurisdiction.35
31 Singer, supra note 12, at 467, 532.
32 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 harv. l. rev. 
193, 193 (1890). 
33 morTon J. horWiTZ, The TransformaTion of american laW, 1780-1860, at 
209 (1977) (“[T]he Brandeis brief, by highlighting social and economic reality, 
suggested that the trouble with existing law was that it was out of touch with 
that reality.”). See also Bix, supra note 7, at 184-85.
34 See supra Part I.
35 Compare Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 20 Cal.4th 907 
(Cal. 1999) (upholding a privacy claim because “employees may enjoy a limited, 
but legitimate expectation that their conversations and other interactions will 
not be secretly videotaped . . . . even though those conversation may not have 
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Here I want to concentrate specifically on what may be unique about privacy 
law, namely, the specific dynamics that contribute to a high prevalence of 
indeterminacy within the doctrine and policy. In addition to shifting technical 
affordances, which provide a challenging environment for the study and 
adjudication of privacy concerns, I identify three sources of indeterminacy 
that are, while not always unique to privacy law, interesting and revealing for 
their specific dynamics. These are a predilection for balancing, a prevalence 
of “hungry” expectations, and an oddly narrow conception of harm.
A. Technical Affordances
As an initial matter, privacy as a collective state is correlated with often 
rapid technological and scientific change.36 Warren and Brandies premise 
the right to privacy on changes in technology (and accompanying business 
practices).37 Justice Douglas invokes technological change in his famous 
dissent from United States v. White, where he refers to the development of 
electronic surveillance as “the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known.”38 
In general, the preservation of privacy relies not only upon legal rights but 
also upon architectural or structural safeguards, which technology can cause 
to shift in either direction.39 Thus, as Harry Surden notes, the placement of 
mortgage information online in a searchable format, which once required a 
physical trip to the courthouse to discover, diminishes privacy even though 
there has been no change to the legal protections afforded to homeowners.40
been completely private”), and Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal.2d 224 (1953) 
(dismissing a privacy claim because defendant’s photograph merely “extended 
knowledge of the particular incident to a somewhat larger public that actually 
witnessed it at the time of occurrence”). See also Woodrow Hartzog, The Public 
Information Fallacy, 98 B.u. l. rev. 1, 6 (forthcoming 2018) (“The main thesis 
of this article is that because there are so many different possible interpretations 
of ‘public information,’ the concept cannot be used to justify data practices and 
surveillance without first articulating a more precise meaning that recognizes 
the values affected.”).
36 I owe this excellent insight to Helen Nissenbaum and to the editorial board. 
37 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32. 
38 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 765 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
39 See generally Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 s.m.u. l. rev. 
1605 (2007). 
40 See id., at 1613-14. 
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B. Competing Values
Balancing is a systemic source of indeterminacy in privacy law. Privacy is a 
value that courts seldom confront in isolation. Balancing occurs throughout 
law, but privacy is nearly always balanced or defined against an important 
competing value such as free speech or physical security. The need to consider 
other values, justified or not, gives pause to virtually any court confronted 
with a claim by an individual or group that information about them should 
be limited. 
1. Free Speech
The most visible counter-value to privacy is free speech.41 In The Right to 
Privacy itself, the authors were careful to acknowledge free speech in certain 
respects by modeling the elements of the privacy torts they proposed in part on 
defamation. From the bench, Brandeis ultimately displayed a deep solicitude 
toward speech, positioning it above privacy in many contexts.42 This conflict 
between privacy and speech makes intuitive sense, at least at first blush, given 
the apparent tension between exerting control over personal information and 
allowing a range of commentary about people and their activities. 
Privacy and speech are thought to conflict in at least three ways.43 First, 
privacy may impermissibly limit the disclosure of information — especially 
by the press. If you know a secret about me and you wish to share it, then 
privacy stands in the way of your communication preferences.44 This is the 
classic tension one encounters with privacy torts such as publication of private 
fact and false light, each of which are today limited by a newsworthiness 
exception. A court interested in diminishing the scope of privacy protections 
41 Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 vand. l. 
rev. 1295, 1296 n.7 (2010) (listing dozens of articles and books exploring this 
tension). 
42 Id. 
43 Much work in privacy is devoted to debunking this apparent tension and showing 
how, in some ways and contexts, privacy is critical to free expression. See, e.g., 
Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright 
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 conn. l. rev. 981 (1996); neil m. richards, 
inTellecTual Privacy: reThinking civil liBerTies in The digiTal age (2015). 
The reverse may also be true. Cf. Daniel Solove, First Amendment as Criminal 
Procedure, 82 n.y.u. l. rev. 112 (2007). 
44 A variety of scholars — Daniel Solove, Neil Richards, Woodrow Hartzog, Jack 
Balkin — seek to rehabilitate confidentiality or invoke agency law (specifically, 
fiduciary obligations) as a means to manage this apparent tension. 
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regarding the transmission of information can get far by characterizing the 
information as a matter concerning the public interest.45 
Second, in some contexts, free speech principles push back against efforts 
to limit the collection of information. Thus, for instance, several U.S. Courts 
of Appeals have found a First Amendment interest in recording the activities 
of public officials such as police officers or the mayor.46 Some scholars would 
expand this insight beyond public accountability into the commercial realm.47
Third, free speech principles mean that government cannot restrict the use 
of lawfully obtained information, including in a commercial context. Thus, 
in Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Supreme Court invalidated an attempt by the 
State of Vermont to limit the use of a database of patient prescriptions to the 
state’s intended goal of promoting less expensive generic versions of drugs.48
2. Security
Free speech may be the most obvious value antonym to privacy but it is hardly 
unique. Worry over criminal activity in general, national security concerns 
in particular, often provides the basis for limiting or displacing privacy.49 
Thus, the British government explains the need for ubiquitous closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) on the basis of terrorism and other crime prevention50 and 
cites terrorism and other serious crime as the basis for calling for a “backdoor” 
to encrypted communications.51 
3. Efficiency
Balancing is also baked into the way the major U.S. privacy watchdog — the 
Federal Trade Commission — addresses firm practices. The FTC’s statement 
on unfairness refers to countervailing benefits to consumers and competition. 
Thus, convenience and competition may limit the capacity of the Federal Trade 
45 This affects other information-based torts such as intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. E.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
46 For a sustained discussion, see Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to 
Record, 97 B.u. l. rev. 167 (2017). 
47 E.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 sTan. l. rev. 57 (2014). 
48 Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
49 See Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?, 83 chi. l. rev. 23 (2016). 
50 See Daniele Fenwick, Terrorism, CCTV, and the Freedom Bill of 2011: Achieving 
Compatibility with Article 8 ECHR?, 25 inT'l rev. l. comPuTers & Tech. 183 
(2011). 
51 Rebecca Hill, UK PM Thereas May’s Response to Terror Attacks “Shortsighted,” 
The regisTer (June 5, 2017), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/06/05/theresa_
may_encryption_plans_slammed/. 
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Commission to police poor data security as an unfair practice under the FTC 
Act.52 Speaking generally, many economists see privacy as harming markets 
by removing information. Thus, law and economics sometimes argues that 
privacy interests must be balanced against efficiency.53
Less obvious, but also interesting, is the tension between privacy and 
other torts — as recent work by Eugene Volokh explores.54 Tort law arguably 
pressures individuals and institutions to engage in greater surveillance, as 
when a lawsuit for negligence succeeds in requiring box stores to monitor 
warehouses or parking lots.55 Thus the value of personal security sometimes 
overbalances privacy even in a civil context with four official privacy torts. 
Privacy, then, as much or more than other areas of U.S. law, seems to 
invite balancing individual and collective privacy interests against serious 
values such as speech, security, and efficiency. 
C. Hungry Exceptions 
American privacy law is also riddled with hungry doctrinal exceptions that 
courts can and do regularly invoke (or selectively ignore). I call these exceptions 
“hungry” due to their tendency to swallow the rule. The three hungry exceptions 
I will discuss here sound in criminal procedure: the third-party doctrine, the 
administrative search expectation, and the contraband rule. But privacy law 
has many others, including privacy in public56 and the carve-outs for speech 
described above. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that privacy is somehow 
the only area of law with major exceptions.57 Rather, I mean to call explicit 
attention to the connection between privacy law’s significant and pervasive 
exceptions, which are much remarked by privacy law scholars, and legal 
realist intuitions about indeterminacy.
52 Daniel J. Solove, The FTC and the Common Law of Privacy, 114 colum. l. 
rev. 583 (2014). 
53 See Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 noTre dame l. rev. 
649 (2016).
54 Eugene Volokh, Tort Law vs. Privacy Law, 113 colum. l. rev. 879 (2014). 
55 Id. 
56 Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 u. miami l. rev. 141 (2014). 
57 Cf. Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 
94 yale l.J. 1, 16 (1984) (discussing the role of exceptions and counter-principles 
in destabilizing law in general). 
2019] Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy 45
1. Third-Party Doctrine 
The first hungry exception is the third-party doctrine. This is the doctrine, 
originally announced in the 1970s and reaffirmed since, that individuals can 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in statements made or materials 
provided to third parties.58 The doctrine holds, for example, that police may 
search through garbage bags temporarily placed on the curb for collection 
without implicating the Fourth Amendment.59 The exception is “hungry” 
in the sense that, as our lives increasingly move into the digital realm, the 
doctrine arguably covers more and more private information. That is, there are 
accelerating opportunities for law enforcement to secure intimate information 
about people from digital service providers in whom the information has 
been entrusted.60
The third-party doctrine generates indeterminacy in a few ways. It is not, 
for instance, always clear where personal information resides; the location of 
information for Fourth Amendment purposes may depend on the perspective the 
jurist adopts regarding the digital sphere.61 For example, as Orin Kerr argues, 
whether banking records left visible on a computer are within the scope of 
a warrant to search a house depends on whether the judge adopts an insider 
or outsider perspective of the internet.62 It is not always clear to whom the 
information belongs.63 And it is not always clear under what circumstances 
the citizen provided the document to a third party, or what the right analogy 
might be. A litigant could credibly argue that data files stored with a secure 
website are best analogized to documents stored in a safety deposit box, which 
government must secure a warrant to access.
58 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979). 
59 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
60 Several caveats are in order. First, statutory law often provides a backdrop for 
government searches of third-party information. Second, firms have the means and 
motivation to resist government attempts to secure data about their consumers. 
See Calo, supra note 49 (arguing that corporations may be best positioned to resist 
government surveillance); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 
70 sTan. l. rev. 99, 167-70 (2018). And third, there may be limits to the third-
party doctrine on the horizon. E.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 
(2018) (requiring a warrant for cellphone consumer location information in part 
on the basis that the consumer did not voluntarily furnish the service provider 
with their location).
61 See Kerr, The Problem of Perspective, supra note 3. 
62 Id. 
63 Cf. Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S.Ct. 2443 (2015) (permitting a facial challenge to 
a municipal statute requiring hotels to turn over information about their guests). 
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2. Administrative Searches 
Administrative searches constitute a second hungry exception. On paper, 
warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively invalid — per se 
unreasonable except under very specifically delineated circumstances. But 
if you think about the actual searches citizens encounter on a daily basis, the 
vast majority fall under just such an exception. Examples include searches or 
seizures at borders, airports, schools, government buildings, drug tests, home 
or business inspections, and presumably many others.64 Such “administrative” 
searches are subject not to a warrant requirement but to an amorphous balancing 
of government interests against the degree of intrusion.65 Thus, outside of 
the classic government intrusion while investigating a crime, judges have 
considerable discretion to characterize the most common sorts of contact with 
government officials as outside the scope of the warrant clause.
3. Contraband Rule 
A third hungry exception is the contraband rule, i.e., the doctrine that citizens 
do not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband. We tend to 
associate this doctrine with the dog-sniffing cases wherein a dog alerts to 
drugs and the courts hold that, setting aside the prospect of false positives, 
the defendant had no reasonable expectation in the illegal substances the dog 
was trained to detect.66 But despite the Court’s characterization of dog-sniffing 
as sui generis in 1983,67 the Court applied the contraband rule the very next 
year to absolve (human) officials who come across a powdery substance and 
subject it to a chemical test for cocaine.68 
Unlike the third-party doctrine and the administrative search exception, 
the contraband rule is not often invoked by courts. But imagine, with Larry 
Lessig and others, the prospect of massive digital searches for unlawful 
content such as pirated material or even criminal conspiracy as detected by 
natural language processing.69 In theory, if the software only alerted in the 
presence of a verifiable crime or unlawful material, the defendant would 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy under the contraband rule. A 
64 Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 colum. l. 
rev. 254, 255-56 (2011). 
65 Id. at 256. 
66 E.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
67 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
68 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
69 laWrence lessig, code 2.0, 20-23 (2006).
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judge could credibly characterize this development as either perfect justice 
or perfectly Orwellian.70
D. Narrow Conception of Harm
Privacy must contend with shifting technical affordances, competing values, and 
serious exceptions. But even assuming that a litigant succeeds in articulating 
a prima facie case for a privacy violation — for example, by meeting the 
elements of intrusion upon seclusion or even showing that a given activity 
violates a state or federal statute — judges who are skeptical of privacy have 
another lever to pull. They can and do argue that the litigant did not suffer a 
legally cognizable harm. Privacy harm is largely in the eyes of the juridical 
beholder, rendering harm a pervasive source of indeterminacy in privacy law. 
We see this in a number of different areas. Many, but not all, class actions 
concerning inadequate security leading to massive data breaches founder 
on harm. Courts are unable or unwilling to recognize the prospect of future 
injury or the anxiety that attends exposure as harms in and of themselves.71 
Ironically, perhaps, given the power of the First Amendment to push back 
against privacy in other contexts, courts are also unwilling to recognize the 
chilling effects of government surveillance as a harm under principles of 
free speech and association.72 Courts do not even always recognize privacy 
harm where the legislature created a specific cause of action to vindicate 
such harm. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the 
70 Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband Exception to 
the Fourth Amendment, 41 u. miami l. rev. 299 (2012). Unlike the third-party 
doctrine (or the privacy in public exception), which the Supreme Court has signaled 
a willingness to revisit, the contraband rule holds strong. The recent (2014) case 
of Florida v. Jardines involved the question whether bringing a trained dog onto 
the porch to sniff for drugs constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court held for the defendant. Rather than revisit the contraband 
rule and hold that dog sniffs constitute a search of the home, however, the Court 
decided the case on the basis of property law: bringing an instrumentality of 
surveillance onto a homeowner’s porch constituted a trespass which triggers 
the warrant requirement. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
71 Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data 
Breach Harms, 96 Tex. l. rev. 737 (2017). But see Ryan Calo, A Long-Standing 
Debate: Reflections on Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms by 
Daniel Solove and Danielle Keats Citron, 96 Tex. l. rev. 59 (2017) (noting 
that Congress has sometimes been successful in dispensing with a showing of 
actual harm, as with the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act).
72 E.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
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Privacy Act of 1974 to require a showing of actual pecuniary harm resulting 
from the government’s mishandling of private citizen data, despite the express 
language of the Act setting minimum damages of $1000 per violation.73
In short, courts engage in a kind of privacy harm exceptionalism that calls 
into question the ability of any given litigant to recover under privacy law, 
even when she has a strong cause of action meeting the technical elements 
of a tort or statute. Courts dating back to 1881 have permitted recovery for 
loss of privacy, as when Mr. and Mrs. Roberts recovered from Dr. De May 
for bringing Mr. Scattergood to assist with the birth of their child.74 Recent 
awards for privacy invasions in the United States have numbered in the tens 
or even hundreds of millions.75 But many judges, and therefore the courts 
they sit upon, do not understand privacy loss as a cognizable injury, even 
as they recognize ephemeral harms in other contexts.76 The phenomenon 
threatens to subvert standing itself. Felix Wu shows that privacy case law has 
instigated a shift in standing doctrine away from deferring to Congress and 
the common law in defining cognizable harm.77 Regardless, harm is a large 
and pervasive source of indeterminacy in privacy law beyond what you find 
in most other domains. 
III. some PrIvAcy reALIsm About reALIsm
To sum up the argument thus far, privacy law has yet to expressly engage 
with American legal realism. This is so despite privacy law’s realist origins, 
privacy law scholarship’s commitment to social science, and the pervasive 
relevance of core legal realist insights to privacy such as the indeterminacy 
thesis. Privacy law owes much to legal realism and ought to acknowledge 
and explore this debt. This last Part now offers a tentative account of what 
73 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. See Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 
12 colo. Tech. l.J. 361 (2014) (discussing Doe v. Chao and FAA v. Cooper). 
Compare copyright law where minimum damages present no such issues. 
74 De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160 (Mich. 1881). 
75 Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 170 So.3d 125 (Fla. 2015) (awarding Terry 
Gene Bollea, aka Hulk Hogan, $115 million in compensatory damages and $25 
million in punitive damages). See also Daniel Victor, Erin Andrews Awarded 
$55 Million in Lawsuit Over Nude Video at Hotel, n.y. Times (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/business/media/erin-andrews-awarded-
55-million-in-lawsuit-over-nude-video-at-hotel.html. 
76 See generally, Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, supra note 73.
77 Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 dePaul. l. rev. 439, 
461 (2017). 
2019] Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy 49
legal realism might in turn learn from privacy. Although the field has not 
consciously invoked realism, scholars have rather meticulously applied 
social scientific methods to privacy law and policy. And some of its recent 
conclusions might have been interesting and reaffirming to Llewellyn, Cohen, 
and their colleagues. 
I often explain the indeterminacy thesis to non-lawyers by reference to two 
opposite adages: “absence makes the heart grow fonder” and “out of sight, 
out of mind.” Both feel like received wisdom about matters of the heart and 
yet they point in opposite directions. A person in a position to quash or fan 
concerns over a relationship becoming long-distance might invoke either, 
depending on his or her goals. In theory, however, the question is an empirical 
one. We might look to social science to see whether, in fact, people tend to 
grow more or less attached to an absent partner. But it turns out that social 
science provides no such relief. Researchers have studied the question and the 
results are fundamentally mixed. Some studies find that time away increases 
fondness and intimacy, whereas others find evidence of increased negativity.78
What privacy scholarship shows, I think, is that social scientific models 
and theories that purport to predict behavior often conflict; accordingly, they 
may not account for judicial decision-making any more than legal doctrines. 
Imagine that we are trying to figure out why courts are so unfriendly to 
privacy claims. We know the law formally recognizes privacy rights in some 
contexts and that a path toward victim recovery is often possible. But in 
practice, privacy claims run into conflicting values, expansive exceptions, 
and skepticism over harm. If the law itself does not dictate a result one way 
or another, what does?
Law and economics, an influential child of legal realism, offers a credible 
candidate: efficiency. Economists in general, law and economics scholars in 
particular, tend to be heavily skeptical about privacy for its tendency to deny 
market participants information.79 Principals cannot make good decisions about 
agents without personal information. Producers and consumers cannot make 
good decisions about what to make or buy without behavioral information. 
And so on. “Face it,” economist Kenneth Laudon remarks, “[p]rivacy is indeed 
78 Compare L. Crystal Jian & Jeffrey T. Hancock, Absence Makes the Communication 
Grow Fonder: Geographic Separation, Interpersonal Media, and Intimacy in 
Dating Relationships, 63 J. comm. 556 (2013), with Lisa M. Diamond, Angela 
M. Hicks, & Kimberly D. Otter-Henderson, Every Time You Go Away: Changes 
in Affect, Behavior, and Physiology Associated with Travel-Related Separations 
from Romantic Partners, 95 J. PersonaliTy & soc. Psychol. 385, 385-403 
(2008).
79 Calo, supra note 53. 
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about creating and maintaining asymmetries in the distribution of information.”80 
If, as law and economics predicts, judges decide cases in ways that maximize 
efficiency and channel goods and services to their highest value use, then 
one branch of social science at least predicts an overall judicial skepticism 
toward a force like privacy that stands in the way.
Does efficiency explain judicial skepticism regarding privacy? Recently 
information scientist Alessandro Acquisti and economists Curtis Taylor and 
Liad Wagman undertook an exhaustive literature review of the economics 
of privacy.81 Reviewing several dozen articles, which the authors sorted into 
three “waves,” they came to the following conclusion: sometimes privacy 
undermines efficiency and social welfare, while at other times it promotes 
it.82 Depending on the context, as well as the starting assumptions, models, 
and data selection of researchers, privacy can be shown to have conflicting 
effects on efficiency and social welfare. 
This insight is hardly limited to economics. Feminist legal theory is famously 
conflicted about privacy as well, noting its importance in protecting women 
from intimate partner violence, revenge pornography, and other abuses, 
while simultaneously recognizing the ways privacy and privacy rhetoric 
create private spaces where men are free to engage in domination without 
scrutiny.83 Privacy is critical to self-exploration and expression. Its absence 
can be nothing short of deadly for LGBTQ youth. But privacy is also the 
chief rationale cited by proponents of legislation requiring people to use the 
bathroom corresponding to their birth gender.84 
While social science and theory are undoubtedly relevant to understanding 
and adjudicating privacy issues, they are in no sense dispositive. The notion 
that we can “look beyond” doctrine to these exterior sources to understand 
why judges really make the decisions they do is subject to an important 
qualification. Social scientists and theorists, no less than judges, can have 
different starting assumptions, leverage different models and methods, and 
draw differing conclusions from data. For every economic analysis there is a 
reply. For every plaintiff expert there is a defense expert. There is no single 
80 Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 comm. acm 92, 98 (1996). 
81 Acquisti et al., supra note 10. 
82 Id. at 442 (“[T]here are theoretical and empirical situations where the protection 
of privacy can both enhance, and detract from, individual and societal welfare.”).
83 Reva B. Seigel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 
105 yale l.J. 2117 (1996).
84 Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 nW. u.l. rev. 159 (2015). 
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Brandies Brief but a host of amicus curiae describing society from a variety 
of perspectives.85 
Obviously I am not attempting to impugn social science as such. I recognize 
that close observation and rigorous adherence to sound methodology yield 
invaluable insights. I also recognize that social science often yields considerable 
uniformity — around many matters, there is widespread academic consensus. 
But this is just to say that careful human activities and systems have ways of 
cabining discretion, and that there exist both easy and hard cases. 
Privacy law and scholarship has, as the legal realists suggest, looked to 
social science in order to inform our understanding. But far from explaining 
legal results in light of indeterminacy, we have found a deeper, more complex 
indeterminacy born of the complexity of privacy itself as a societal force. The 
observation that social science invites secondary indeterminacy crystalizes and 
empirically corroborates and considerably deepens the intuitions of Cohen, 
Llewellyn, and other legal realists who stopped short of recommending that 
social sciences (or “social facts”) displace law.86 Further, it calls into question 
the project of explaining legal decisions entirely on the basis of extralegal 
understandings. Privacy law has rigorously, if unconsciously, followed this 
approach and found it lacking. 
concLusIon
Privacy law’s origins are steeped in legal realism, yet privacy law scholarship 
to date has paid relatively little express attention to the movement. This Article 
has sought to provide a bridge between legal realism and privacy, first by 
positing U.S. privacy law as a potentially rich and complex source of legal 
indeterminacy, and second by exploring the effects of applying social scientific 
methods to privacy law. Privacy must grapple with technological shifts, 
competing values, broad exceptions, and deep skepticism regarding harm. 
Where privacy law offers relief, it does so against a backdrop of affirmative 
choices by jurists to embrace privacy as an ascendant value.87 Privacy law 
scholarship, meanwhile, demonstrates that social science is unlikely entirely 
85 Cf. David E. Berstein, Brandeis Brief Myths, 15 green Bag 9, 11 (2011) (noting 
that Joseph Lochner’s own brief in Lochner v. New York included a lengthy 
appendix providing statistics about the health of bakers relative to other professions. 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
86 I owe this point to Hanoch Dagan. 
87 They are what Alan Westin might have called “privacy fundamentalists.” Cf. Chris 
Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo Economicus, 
49 Wake foresT l. rev. 261 (2014) (discussing Westin’s categories).
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to fill the gaps left by rule indeterminacy, as the legal realists themselves 
predicted. This is so because economic and other lenses are themselves open 
and contested, such that starting assumptions and methodological choices by 
social scientists can and do influence conclusions. Ultimately, indeterminacy 
is likely a component of any complex human activity, including and beyond 
the law.
